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Diseases induced by obligate intracellular pathogens have a large burden on global
human and animal health. Understanding the factors involved in the virulence and fitness
of these pathogens contributes to the development of control strategies against these
diseases. Based on biological observations, a theoretical model using game theory
is proposed to explain how obligate intracellular bacteria interact with their host. The
equilibrium in such a game shows that the virulence and fitness of the bacterium is
host-triggered and by changing the host’s defense system to which the bacterium
is confronted, an evolutionary process leads to an attenuated strain. Although, the
attenuation procedure has already been conducted in practice in order to develop an
attenuated vaccine (e.g., with Ehrlichia ruminantium), there was a lack of understanding
of the theoretical basis behind this process. Our work provides a model to better
comprehend the existence of different phenotypes and some underlying evolutionary
mechanisms for the virulence of obligate intracellular bacteria.
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BACKGROUND
Obligate intracellular bacteria are characterized by reproducing only within the cells of other
organisms and are cause of several diseases that affect different type of hosts, from humans to
protists. Obligate intracellular bacteria include, amongst others, Chlamydia, rickettsial pathogens
(i.e., Rickettsia, Anaplasma, Ehrlichia), and Coxiella; and the burden of the diseases they induce
can be very large. For instance, global Chlamydia infections lead to 714,000 disability-adjusted life
years (DALYs) lost in 2010 (Murray et al., 2013), and in 1993 the USDA estimated that the cost of a
Heartwater outbreak (disease caused by Ehrlichia ruminantium) in the USA could exceed US$ 760
million in losses annually (Gersabeck, 1994).
A pathogen such as Ehrlichia, uses tightly regulated pathogenicity determinants to hijack host
cellular processes and replicate inside the cell (extensively reviewed in Moumène and Meyer,
2016). Thus, the invasion of the cell requires bacterial adhesion to a specific receptor. Immediately
after endocytosis, Ehrlichia establishes a safe replicating niche by evading host innate immunity
through the induction of dedicated secretion systems and secretion of corresponding type I and
IV effector proteins. Bacterial replication itself needs nutrients from the host and occurs thanks to
the subversion of host cell machineries (e.g., manipulation of autophagy or cholesterol pathways;
Barnewall et al., 1997; Niu et al., 2008; Xiong et al., 2008; Wakeel et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2012; Xiong
and Rikihisa, 2012). Recent transcriptomic studies on E. ruminantium infectious form provide
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evidence of the expression of genes involved in the bacterial
defense and invasion systems, showing that Ehrlichia allocates
a significant part of its energetic resources to virulent purposes
(Pruneau et al., 2012).
During Ehrlichia infection, the host’s extracellular defense
system involves cellular immunity with macrophages, CD4+
T-cells and production of IL-17 by peripheral blood leukocytes
(Totté et al., 1999; Bitsaktsis et al., 2004; McGill et al., 2016).
Dendritic cells also play a role in immunity against Ehrlichia
(Nandi et al., 2009). Despite the obligate intracellular nature
of Ehrlichia, the role of humoral immunity has also been
described using tandem repeat proteins or outer membrane
proteins as antigens (Yager et al., 2005; reviewed in Rikihisa,
2015).
On the other hand, the intracellular defense system is
characterized by the induction of the phagolysosomal fusion,
the generation of reactive oxygen species, the activation of
proinflammatory chemokines/cytokines, IFN-gamma activation
and signaling, the production of antimicrobial peptides and the
induction of host cell apoptosis (Rikihisa, 2010; de la Fuente
et al., 2016). Therefore, the bacterial success to replicate should
depend on whether it faces both the extra- and intra-cellular
host’s defense systems or just one of them.
It has been shown that in vitro passaging of the obligate
intracellular bacteria E. ruminantium can lead to an attenuated
strain (Jongejan, 1991; Zweygarth et al., 2005; Pilet et al.,
2012; Marcelino et al., 2015). In vitro and in vivo infection
essays have shown that the virulent strain is highly pathogenic
to goats and toxic to host cells in vitro just after infection,
while the attenuated strain is not lethal in goats and has
a shorter life cycle (Pilet et al., 2012; Marcelino et al.,
2015). Although, this mechanism has been essential for the
development of inactivated vaccines against obligate intracellular
bacterial infections, such as Heartwater (Zweygarth et al.,
2005, 2008; Vachiéry et al., 2006), there is little understanding
of the attenuation process and no formal theory has been
proposed.
Moreover, proteomic studies have increased the
understanding of the main differences that exist between
the attenuated and virulent strains of E. ruminantium (Marcelino
et al., 2015). While 292 proteins (80% of the proteome)
were found to be common between the attenuated and the
virulent strains, there is a significant number of strain-specific
proteins expressed (49 proteins for the virulent and 72 for
the attenuated). A higher number of proteins useful to fuel
specific processes involved in virulence were detected in the
virulent strain, while a higher number of proteins associated
with metabolism of lipids and amino acids, protein processing,
and biosynthesis of co-factors could relate to higher growth
rate of the attenuated strain in vitro (Marcelino et al., 2015).
This suggests that part of the energy available to the virulent
strain is used to evade the host’s defense system, while the
attenuated strain seems to reserve this energy to replication
purposes. In other bacteria, some molecular determinants have
been associated with the attenuation mechanism. For instance,
in the case of Rickettsia prowazekii, mutations of a single
gene (smt) that encodes a SAM-methyltransferase led to the
attenuation of the bacteria (Liu et al., 2014). When comparing
different phenotypes of R. prowazekii, transcriptional and
proteomic analyses have shown that surface protein expression
and protein methylation varied with virulence (Bechah et al.,
2010).
GAME THEORY
Game theory has gained popularity among biologists to analyze
biological interactions involving two or more organisms and
to elucidate evolutionary consequences of interactions (Smith,
1979), and has been proposed as a more appropriate approach
to analyze evolutionary puzzles than optimization algorithms
(Nowak and Sigmund, 2004). In evolutionary game theory, the
success of a strategy is not just determined by how good the
strategy is, but the presence of other alternative strategies and
the frequency at which they are employed within a competing
population play a very important role in determining which
population will eventually become dominant. An evolutionary
stable strategy leads to equilibrium such that once the strategy is
fixed in a population, natural selection is sufficient to avoid other
strategies to invade and change the equilibrium (Maynard-Smith,
1983).
This approach has been used to model complex situations for
which natural environments, spatial and temporal variability in
resource abundance and quality can influence biotic interactions
(Nowak and May, 1992), such as competition for territories
between organisms (Hammerstein, 1981), the location of
pathogenic bacteria during persistent infection (Eswarappa,
2009), or the status of different symbiotic relationships (Renaud
and Meeüs, 1991).
In the context of obligate intracellular bacteria, game theory
can help to understand how the host-pathogen interaction
leads to an equilibrium that determines the characteristics of
the bacteria. Understanding the host-pathogen interaction with
obligate intracellular bacteria would assist in the identification
of evolutionary differences between strains of the same bacteria
and elucidate mechanisms that can lead to the control of
such organisms. Experimental data regarding the genes or
proteins involved in bacterial pathogenesis is crucial to depict
the strategy implemented by a bacterium when infecting
its host.
THE EVASION-REPLICATION GAME FOR
E. RUMINANTIUM
We propose a repeated host-pathogen game to analyze the
evolution of obligate intracellular pathogenic bacteria in terms
of virulence and fitness. The results obtained from solving the
game enable us to propose one scenario for understanding why
in vitro passaging leads to the attenuation of the bacterium, and
provides some insights on the phenotypic differences observed
between strains of E. ruminantium.
There are two players in this game: the intracellular bacterium
and the host. Each player chooses a strategy and the payoff of each
player not only depends on the strategy that the player chose, but
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also on the strategy that his opponent selected. The strategies are
the following:
- Intracellular bacterium:
◦ Strategy B1: Evasion of host’s defense before replication—
Before trying to replicate, the bacterium pays a cost c in
terms of energy to evade the host’s extracellular defense
system.
◦ Strategy B2: Replication without evasion of extracellular
immune response—concentrates all the energy to replicate,
without spending energy in evading host’s defense system.
- Host:
◦ Strategy H1: Incomplete defense—Only intracellular defense
mechanisms are expressed.
◦ Strategy H2: Complete defense—Both, intra and
extracellular defense mechanisms are expressed.
It is to note that a situation characterized by a host adopting
strategy H1 (incomplete defense) represents the in vitro scenario;
while a host adopting strategy H2 (complete defense) represents
the in vivo scenario.
Assumptions
A bacterium interacting with a host that follows the incomplete
defense strategy H1 succeeds in replicating with probability equal
to 1 by adopting strategy B1 (evasion before replication) and
with probability equal to r by adopting strategy B2 (replication
without evasion). On the other hand, a bacterium interacting
with a host following the complete defense strategy H2 can
succeed in replicating only after evading the host’s defense
system, with a probability of success equal to s. With L being
the gain of the bacterium if it succeeds to replicate, assume that
r > L− cL , i.e., whenever the bacterium faces the incomplete
defense system, its optimal response is replicating without
evasion (B2).
Payoffs
- Bacterium:
◦ If the host uses the incomplete defense system (strategy H1),
let Pb be the payoff of the bacteria, L the gain of the bacterium
if it succeeds to replicate, and c the energy cost of evading the
host’s defense system, then the bacterium’s expected payoffs
are:
 Evasion before replication strategy (strategy B1): Pb =
L − c
 Replication without evasion strategy (strategy B2): Pb = rL
◦ If the host uses the complete defense system:
 Evasion before replication strategy (strategy B1): Pb =
sL − c
 Replication without evasion strategy (strategy B2): Pb = 0
- Host:
The payoff of the host is a loss function proportional to the
gain of the bacterium, i.e., PH = − kPb, with k > 0.
Therefore, the normal form game is:
Incomplete defense Complete defense
(intracellular) (intra+ extracellular)
Evasion before
replication
L− c,−k(L− c) sL− c,−k(sL− c)
Replication
without evasion
rL,−krL 0, 0
GAME’S EQUILIBRIUM AND DISCUSSION
For the host, activating the complete defense system (intra- and
extra-cellular) is a dominant strategy, whereas the bacterium has
no dominant strategy. Thus, when facing a host that adopts the
incomplete defense system (strategy H1), the best response for
the bacterium is to replicate without evading (since r > L− cL ),
but when facing the host’s complete defense system (strategy H2),
the best response is the evasion before replication strategy if the
probability of success is sufficiently high (s ≥ cL ) (Figure 1).
Therefore, there is a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium:
(Evasion before replication, Complete defense). Let’s call this
equilibrium the “virulent equilibrium,” which is the outcome
observed in nature and is characterized by a high level of
virulence that can lead to the death of the animal.
It has been shown that E. ruminantium becomes attenuated
after several passages in laboratory conditions. In our game,
“in vitro” conditions were captured by restricting the host player
exclusively to his incomplete defense system (intracellular). In
this case, the bacterium has no interest in paying the cost of the
virulent strategy, since it can replicate without the need to evade
the host’s defense system. Thus, the “attenuated equilibrium”
is: (Replication without evasion, Incomplete defense). Note that
this equilibrium is not observed in nature and it can only be
achieved in a scenario in which the host does not have access
to the complete defense system (such as the in vitro conditions).
At this equilibrium, the speed at which the bacterium replicates
increases and overcomes the baseline replication speed observed
at the virulent equilibrium.
According to our game, virulence is not just a reflect of the
bacterium’s characteristics but it is the outcome of the interaction
between the bacterium and the host defense system. When the
bacterium faces the host’s complete defense system, the best
strategy is to evade the defense system before replicating. This
increases the probability of successful replication due to the
delivery of effectors that counteract the host immune response
and scavenge the host cell. Thus, bacterial populations that
invest energy in evading the host’s defense system present a
replicative advantage in vivo and end up being dominant over less
virulent bacterial populations. However, this strategy requires
the consumption of energy that decreases the final payoff of the
bacterium.
In a repeated game framework, we can imagine that the
cost of the evading strategy (ability to evade the host’s immune
responses) depends on how frequently this strategy is chosen
(“if you fail to practice your art, it will soon disappear”). If the
cost c is an increasing function of the number of times that
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FIGURE 1 | Bacterium’s best response. The optimal strategy for the bacterial player depends on the cost-efficiency parameters (s and c). (A) If the bacterium faces
the host’s incomplete defense system (only intracellular), the best response is to replicate without evading (strategy B2). (B) If the bacterium faces the host’s complete
defense system (both, intra- and extracellular), the best response is to evade before replicating (strategy B1) if the efficiency parameter [s] is sufficiently high relative to
the cost parameter [c].
the replication-without-evasion strategy (strategy B2) has been
chosen in the past [i.e., c = c (n) with c′ (n) > 0, where n
is the number of times the replication-without-evasion strategy
has been chosen], the fact that Ehrlichia becomes attenuated
after several passages and unable to survive in vivo afterwards
can be explained: when facing the in vitro conditions, the best
strategy of Ehrlichia is replicating without evasion (strategy B2).
If the bacterium keeps facing the in vitro conditions for a while,
the cost of the evading strategy (strategy B1) increases, and
the cost can become sufficiently high (c > sL) such that the
replication-without-evasion strategy becomes dominant (for the
complete game). Therefore, even if those bacteria face again the
complete game (i.e., the host activating both defense systems),
the dominant strategy will not change, the bacterium will not
be able to survive the host’s defense system, and the host will
survive.
In evolutionary terms, bacterial subpopulations genetically
predisposed to invest fewer resources in evading their host’s
defense system are more efficient in replicating when facing
the in vitro environment. By passaging the bacteria in vitro,
the selection pressure picks for the fittest bacteria, which in
this case are those overexpressing genes/proteins associated with
replication and not evasion of the host’s extracellular immune
defense.
We propose a model where the evolution of E. ruminantium’s
aggressiveness is triggered by the host. The amplitude of the
aggressiveness of the bacterium is proportional to its virulence
(ability to induce symptoms) and its fitness (ability to replicate
inside the cell in vitro; Figure 2). A virulent strain counteracts
the host immune response, scavenges the host cell, and ends up
leading to the death of the animal. This strategy is associated with
the production of proteins that consumes energy and leads to a
moderate fitness (development cycle of 5 days for the virulent
Gardel strain of E. ruminantium; Marcelino et al., 2015). Then,
by the mean of iterative in vitro passages, the resulting strain
increases its speed of replication but ends up losing the ability
to hijack host immunity. This attenuated strain exhibits a greater
fitness in vitro (development cycle of 4 days for attenuated Gardel
strain, Marcelino et al., 2015) but a diminished virulence once
inside the animal (animal survival), leading to its elimination
when confronted to the animal’s immune system. This behavior
illustrates the molecular co-evolutionary arms race between a
pathogen and its host.
In the laboratory it has been shown that the Gardel strain is
attenuated after 237 passages, while the Senegal strain is already
attenuated after just 64 passages and the Welgevonden strain
needs only 43 passages to attenuate (Zweygarth et al., 2005; Pilet
et al., 2012; Marcelino et al., 2015). These differences can be
explained by slightly modifying the game: Instead of assuming
r > L− cL , consider r a random variable such that at every period
r = r+ > L− c(0)L with probability q and r = r
− <
L− c(0)
L with
probability 1-q. If the probability q is strain-specific such that
0 < qGardel < qSenegal < qWelgevonden < 1, Senegal’s number
of periods required to stabilize the attenuated equilibrium is
smaller than Gardel’s but greater than Welgevonden’s.1
An alternative explanation would be associated to differences
in the strains’ efficiency at investing energy resources into
mechanisms to evade their host’s extracellular defense system.
According to our model, strains or subpopulations of bacteria
that are very efficient in evading the host defense responses (small
c) would be hardest to attenuate. In models such as the Neisseria
gonorrhoeae, regulators of two-component systems have been
identified as determinants of virulence (Atack et al., 2013). Strains
or mutants lacking this type of master regulators, which are
associated with the efficiency in using energy resources, should
be easier to attenuate.
The transition from the in vivo to the in vitro equilibrium can
be represented in a continuous framework, in which a bacterium
selects the optimal level of fitness and virulence according to
its energy constraint (Figure 3). In vivo, bacteria with very high
fitness but not enough virulence will be easily detected by the
1Note that the attenuated equilibrium is stabilized for all strains since c is an
increasing function of the number of times that the replication-without-evasion
strategy (strategy B2) has been chosen in the past so in the long run r− >
L− c(n)
L and the replication-without-evasion strategy (strategy B2) becomes strictly
dominant.
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FIGURE 2 | Evolution of host-triggered aggressiveness in an obligate intracellular pathogenic bacterium. In this scheme, the ultimate amplitude of
aggressiveness is proportional to virulence (ability to induce symptoms and evading the host’s immune system) and fitness (ability to replicate inside the cell in vitro).
First, a virulent strain that sickens the animal delivers effector proteins (i) to counteract host immune response and (ii) to scavenge the host cell. Effector synthesis is an
energy-consuming process that leads to a moderate fitness in vitro(development cycle of 5 days for virulent Gardel strain). Second, by the mean of iterative passages
in vitro, the resulting attenuated strain gained skills to grow in cell culture but lost the ability to hijack host immunity and is eliminated when injected in the animal. Thus,
this strain exhibits a greater fitness in vitro (development cycle of 4 days for attenuated Gardel strain) but a decreased virulence once inside the animal (host’s success
in eliminating the bacterium). This behavior highlights the co-evolutionary arms race between a bacterial pathogen and its host.
complete defense system and eliminated (red zone in Figure 3A).
However, the change in the host’s strategy (in vitro conditions)
reduces the area in which the bacterium is eliminated and a new
optimal strategy that leads to the attenuated strain is established,
which is characterized by a lower virulence and a higher fitness
(Figure 3B). The fitness-virulence combination of the attenuated
strain belongs to the range of strategies that the host’s complete
defense system is able to cope with. When the attenuated strain
faces again the in vivo conditions, its higher fitness leads to
a high replication rate that makes easy for the host’s immune
system to detect the bacterium. Moreover, the lower virulence
of the new equilibrium makes the bacterium unable to evade the
host’s complete defense system, which ends up eliminating the
infection.
The virulent strain of E. ruminantium expresses a high
number of chaperones and proteins to avoid oxidative stress
and to overwhelm the humoral immune response (Marcelino
et al., 2015). On the contrary, the attenuated strain overexpresses
proteins related to rapid bacterial replication (Marcelino et al.,
2015). In our model, the payoff of expressing proteins related
to virulence decreases when the bacterium does not face the
host’s extracellular immune response. This leads to a change
in the bacterium’s optimal strategy, in which the payback of
allocating resources for the expression of proteins involved in
bacterial replication is higher than the return obtained from
the expression of proteins involved in host manipulation and
virulence in general.
The change of equilibrium is explained by the competition
and selection of the fittest population. When the bacterium
is facing the host’s incomplete defense system (strategy H1),
the subpopulation characterized by trying to replicate without
evading (strategy B2) gains a comparative advantage relative to
the subpopulation characterized by evading the host immune
system before trying to replicate (strategy B1). This advantage,
coming from the energy saved associated to strategy B2, makes
the population evolve to an equilibrium dominated by bacteria
that follow strategy B2, i.e., the attenuated bacteria that reach the
maximum fitness to reproduce in vitro. Once this population is
faced back against the host’s complete defense system (strategy
H2), the diminishing virulence obtained during the evolutionary
process makes the bacterium unable to go back to the original
equilibrium (the bacterium has no time to set up strategy B1
before being eliminated by the host, as observational data has
shown).
The results of our model suggest that at least part of the
difference in virulence levels among strains can be attributed
to the co-evolution between host and pathogen. Thus, bacteria
facing tolerant or resistant hosts, with sophisticated and effective
immune systems, need to allocate a good amount of energetic
resources in evading their host’s defenses, leading them to high
virulence levels. When naïve or susceptible hosts are challenged
with these bacteria, the expected outcome would be high levels
of morbidity/mortality. However, if the interaction between the
pathogen and the susceptible hosts is for long-term, the less
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FIGURE 3 | Transition from in vivo to in vitro equilibrium. The tradeoff between fitness and virulence is represented by the downward sloping efficient frontier
(blue line), and the green dotted lines represent the indifference curves. Each indifference curve represents the combination of fitness and virulence that provide the
same payoff to the bacteria and we assume that the payoff landscape is independent on the virulence and increasing on fitness, which determines the form of the
indifference curves (P1 < P2 < P3). (A) When facing the in vivo conditions (intra- and extracellular defense systems are adopted by the host) the payoff of the
bacterium in the red zones is equal to zero (if the bacteria are too virulent, they will kill the host along with the bacteria themselves; if the bacteria are not virulent
enough relative to their fitness, they will be easily detected by the host’s immune system and eliminated), and the optimal strategy for the bacterium is characterized by
the tangency point between the highest indifference curve and the efficient frontier (point A). (B) When moving to the in vitro conditions (only intracellular defense
system is adopted by the host), the zone for which the bacterium’s payoff is reduced, so the equilibrium changes (point B) and the bacterium achieves a higher payoff
(P3 > P2). However, when the bacterium faces back the in vivo conditions, the equilibrium point B gets into the red zone. This means that the bacteria are not virulent
enough (relative to their fitness) to evade the host’s immune system and they are eliminated.
virulent bacteria subpopulations that use more resources for
replication (and less for evading the host’s immune system)
should have an evolutionary advantage and the general levels of
virulence in the bacterial population are expected to decrease.
A similar reasoning applies to experiments showing how
bacteria adapt to the interaction with immunocompromised
hosts by reducing their virulence and increasing bacterial within-
host fitness (Jansen et al., 2015). The bacteria can make a
transition from pathogenicity to commensalism by selecting the
avirulent strategy, which allows the bacteria to maximize the use
of host resources.
Game theory has been used to analyse problems in cell and
molecular biology with a broad range of objectives such as
understanding metabolic processes, including the production
of costly public goods by cells or cross-feeding, or analysing
different competition and interaction models between cellular
populations (Hummert et al., 2014).
On the host-pathogen interaction, the concept of Evolutionary
Stable Strategies (ESS) has been widely used to characterize
the host-pathogen interaction at equilibrium. This approach
simplifies the solution of mathematical models developed to
analyse the trade-off hypothesis of virulence taking into account
immunopathology and how pathogens’ virulence evolves (Day
et al., 2007). The ESS approach was also used to conciliate the
theory with the empirical work about the variance observed
in tolerance within hosts by introducing a cost on host fitness
(fertility) associated with investing in defense (Best et al., 2008).
A comparable model to ours have been used to characterize
two host-pathogen relationships (the killer relationship and
diplomat relationship) as potential equilibria that lead to different
ways of evolution (coevolution vs. concomitant evolution), and
to understand the relevant parameters for reaching a specific
equilibria (Renaud and Meeüs, 1991).
Our contribution in the work presented herein relies on
the characterization of the transition from a virulent to an
attenuated equilibrium (attenuation process). Moreover, our
study investigates the evolution of an obligate intracellular
bacterium by decoupling the intracellular vs. extracellular
selective pressure. Thus, our results highlight the important role
that the host plays in the virulence attenuation process of obligate
intracellular bacteria.
The proposed game allows us to understand the evolutionary
process that leads to the observed virulence/fitness levels of
attenuated or virulent obligate intracellular bacteria, such as
E. ruminantium, in in vivo and in vitro conditions (Pilet
et al., 2012; Marcelino et al., 2015). Our game shows that the
aggressiveness of an obligate intracellular pathogenic bacterium
is host-triggered and that modifying the host’s defense system can
lead to an attenuated strain due to an evolutionary process.
By using game theory tools, we provide theoretical basis to the
process of generating attenuated strains of obligate intracellular
bacterial pathogens, which is already used to develop control
strategies such as attenuated vaccines. Moreover, this framework
can be used to understand why bacteria can pass from pathogenic
to commensal when confronted with an immunocompromised
host (Jansen et al., 2015).
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